Hope or Nope --Is  Obama Hope  Protected by Idea/Expression Dichotomy, Fair Use Doctrine, & First Amendment? by Senda, Hiro
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 4 
9-1-2010 
Hope or Nope --Is "Obama Hope" Protected by Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy, Fair Use Doctrine, & First Amendment? 
Hiro Senda 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hiro Senda, Hope or Nope --Is "Obama Hope" Protected by Idea/Expression Dichotomy, Fair Use Doctrine, 
& First Amendment?, 10 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 65 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol10/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
Copyright © 2011, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
 
10 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 65 
Hope or Nope—Is “Obama Hope” Protected by Idea/Expression 






Andy Warhol once said, “Art is what you can get away with.”1 Warhol may be one of the 
most famous modern artists. He is also known for appropriating images from popular culture to 
create many works, such as paintings of Campbell’s Soup Can and Marilyn Monroe. 2  
“Appropriation art” is generally defined as “a modern art movement that questions the creative 
act by incorporating imagery or concepts that are lifted, adapted, or directly referenced from a 
commercial, pop culture, historical art or other precedent, generally without the permission of the 
original creator.” 3  However, this is a legally unfortunate term, particularly in a copyright 
context.4 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, appropriation means “[t]he exercise of control 
over property; a taking of possession.” 5  Even Andy Warhol could not get away with 
appropriating images without facing copyright law problems.6 In his final interview, when asked 
about the copyright situation, he stated, “It’s just like a Coca Cola bottle—when you buy it, you 
always think that it’s yours and you can do whatever you like with it. . . . I don’t want to get 
involved, it’s too much trouble.”7  
 
Warhol has influenced many modern artists, including visual artist Shepard Fairey.8 
Fairey created the famous iconic image of the Barack Obama “HOPE” poster, (“Obama Hope”), 
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1 See Andy Warhol Shop, http://www.thewarholshop.com/quotes.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2009); The Warhol, 
Warhol Store, http://www.warholstore.com/staticpage/Andy-Warhol-Quote---Art-is-What-you-Can-Get-Away-
Magnet.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
2 The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Andy Warhol Biography, 
http://www.warholfoundation.org/legacy/biography.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). 
3 ArtWeLove, Appropriation Art, http://artwelove.com/explore/Movements-and-Styles/Appropriation-Art (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2009). 
4 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006). 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
6 See Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
219, 225-26 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Gary Comenas, Andy Warhol’s Flower Paintings, WARHOLSTARS, 
http://www.warholstars.org/chron/lnx/flowrs64.html (last visited, Nov. 13, 2009) (noting that after Warhol was sued 
for infringing a copyrighted photograph, he became careful about appropriation and started taking photographs for 
himself). 
7 Gary Comenas, Andy Warhol Interview Part Two, WARHOLSTARS, 
http://www.warholstars.org/warhol/warhol1/warhol1n/andy.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (reproducing transcript 
of an Interview by Paul Taylor with Andy Warhol, FLASH ART (April 1987)). 
8 Sebastian Smee, Street Smart: Shepard Fairey Makes His Mark in an Eye-catching Show at the ICA, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2009, at G6. 
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widely seen during the 2008 presidential election.9 He also designed another Obama collage that 
appeared on the cover of Time magazine’s Person of the Year 2008 issue. 10  Fairey made 
headlines in 2009 as he began a copyright infringement dispute with the Associated Press (“AP”) 
regarding the source for his Obama Hope image.11 Nearly eight months after the dispute started, 
Fairey admitted to lying about the source and destroying the evidence.12 As discussed in more 
detail below, Fairey and the AP disputed the real source of the photograph that Fairey 
appropriated as his visual reference, but he abruptly changed his story and admitted that the 
source the AP claimed was the real photograph.13 Thus, Fairey, like Warhol, could not easily 
“get away with” his art without getting involved with copyright trouble. 
 
 Appropriation art is not a new trend. Many famous painters, such as Paul Gauguin, Paul 
Cezanne, and Vincent Van Gogh, also used photographs as their creative reference.14 In contrast, 
legal problems for appropriation artists are a recent phenomenon, emerging in the 1960s when 
Pop artists like Andy Warhol came to fame.15  Strict copyright regulation is making it more 
difficult for appropriation artists, like Fairey, to use existing images to freely express their artistic 
creativity. However, it appears counterintuitive that copyright regulation restricts such artistic 
works considering the protection given to freedom of expression by the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.16 In Fairey’s case the First Amendment argument seems even more applicable 
because he borrowed a public official’s image to express his political opinion. 
 
 Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to accept the First Amendment as an affirmative 
defense in copyright cases where “secondary” users appropriate copyrighted works. 17  As 
explained below, the Supreme Court reasons that the Copyright Act of 197618 accommodates the 
First Amendment goals by limiting copyright protection to original expression under the 
idea/expression dichotomy (hence allowing others to use ideas and information), while 
permitting others to use this original expression under the “fair use” doctrine. The problem with 
this rationale is that there are no clear distinctions between idea and expression or between fair 
use and “unfair” use, leaving decisions to a case-by-case basis. Copyright disputes over these 
issues may increase as Internet technology makes appropriating photograph, videophotographs, 
videos, music, media coverage, and the like easier for any “artist.” For example, is it acceptable 
to copy a New York Times news article found through Google search, paste it on Facebook or 
                                                 
9 Kate Linthicum, Tagged, He’s It Election Becomes Their Turf; Street Artists More Prone to Protest Than 
Consensus Find a Cause They Can Get Behind: the Presumed Democratic Nominee, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at 
1. 
10 Richard Stengel, Person of the Year, TIME, Dec. 29, 2008, at 4. 
11 Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at C1. 
12 Liz Robbins, New Wrinkle in Obama Poster Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at A26. 
13 See Shepard Fairey, Statement on Associated Press Fair Use Case, OBEY GIANT, Oct. 16, 2009, 
http://obeygiant.com/headlines/associated-press-fair-use-case (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); Sri Kasi, AP Statement: 
Fairey Admits He Sued AP Under False Pretenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16, 2009, 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_101609a.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
14 See Antonio Martínez Ron, Famous Painters Copied Photographs, FOGONAZOS, Nov. 6, 2006, 
http://www.fogonazos.es/2006/11/famous-painters-copied-photopraphs_06.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
15 Meyers, supra note 6, at 225. 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (2001).  
18 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332. 
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Twitter, and comment on it? Can we “Warholize”19 or “Obamicon”20 pictures found on Flickr to 
create posters to sell? Can a singer who supports a Democratic presidential candidate prohibit a 
Republican candidate from using his or her song on a campaign commercial and posting it on 
YouTube?21 
 
 Since the Obama Hope case includes very broad issues, such as the tension between 
copyright and the First Amendment, the case might provide the court with an opportunity to 
clarify some of copyright law’s unresolved questions. While analyzing the Obama Hope case, 
this article will thoroughly illustrate the current jurisprudence of copyright law. Part I will 
explain the factual background and legal disputes of the Obama Hope case. Part II will look into 
the idea/expression dichotomy in the Copyright Act of 1976 and analyze whether Fairey 
infringed the AP’s copyright by using its photograph for the Obama Hope. Part III will discuss 
the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act and apply it to the Obama Hope case, determining 
whether it defends Fairey’s use as fair use. Part IV will discuss the First Amendment values and 
apply constitutional standard of review to the Obama Hope case. Finally, Part V will conclude 




A. “Obama Hope” 
 
During the 2008 presidential campaign, the iconic image of Barack Obama with his face 
gazing toward the sky and the word “HOPE” attached below him became ubiquitous 
nationwide.22 The artist behind this image, Shepard Fairey, a visual artist whose prior works 
include OBEY Giant,23 used a photograph of Senator Obama that he found through a Google 
search.24 The Obama campaign used Fairey’s art to promote Barack Obama’s candidacy for 
president and Barack Obama himself sent a letter to thank Fairey for the support.25 
 
While Fairey distributed about 300,000 free posters using his Obama Hope image, he 
also sold 4000 posters for $45 each.26 In addition, he sold Obama Hope merchandise, such as T-
shirts, metal buttons, stickers, and coffee mugs.27 Fairey stressed that he created the image to 
                                                 
19 Big Huge Labs, Pop Art Poster: Become a Pop Icon!, http://bighugelabs.com/popart.php (last visited, Nov. 22, 
2009). 
20 Webicon.Me, http://obamiconme.pastemagazine.com (last visited, Nov. 22, 2009). 
21 See Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
22 Linthicum, supra note 9. 
23 See OBEY Giant, http://obeygiant.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2009); OBEY Clothing, History about Shepard 
Fairey, http://obeyclothing.com/#/history/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2009). 
24 Sylvia Rubin, Promote Your Candidate with T-shirts, Truffles, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2008, at F1; Linthicum, 
supra note 9. 
25 William Booth, Obama’s On-the-Wall Endorsement, WASH. POST, May 19, 2008, at M01. 
26 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5-6, Fairey v. Associated Press, 2009 WL 
319564, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/1; Geoff Edgers, 
Shepard the Giant—He’s Gone from Street Artist to Creating an Iconic Image of Barack Obama and Having a Solo 
ICA Show, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2009, at N1. 
27 See Edgers, supra note 26; Ben Arnon, How the Obama “Hope” Poster Reached a Tipping Point and Became a 
Cultural Phenomenon: An Interview with the Artist Shepard Fairey, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2008, available at 
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promote Obama for president and that he reinvested the revenue from the poster and sticker sales 
to make more Obama Hope merchandise.28 He claimed that he donated the revenue to Obama’s 
presidential campaign.29 
 
After Barack Obama was elected President of the United States, his inaugural committee 
asked Fairey to create the official poster for the inauguration.30 Fairey used the same illustration 
of Obama from his own Obama Hope, with the image of the U.S. Capitol and the White House 
in the background and the logo “Be The Change”.31 Fairey received royalties on sales of the 
autographed limited edition posters.32 Later, art collectors obtained the original portrait of the 
Obama Hope collage Fairey first created and donated the work to the National Portrait Gallery of 




Initially many believed that Fairey designed the Obama Hope image by referring to a 
Reuters’ news photograph.34 A Reuters’ photographer even briefly acknowledged that the image 
was based on his photograph.35 However, it turned out that the referenced photograph was taken 
by freelance photographer Mannie Garcia, taken while on assignment for the AP at the National 
Press Club in Washington, D.C. in April 2006.36 Garcia took the photograph of Obama standing 
next to actor George Clooney at a panel discussion.37 
 
After Fairey admitted that he used the AP’s photograph, the AP released a statement, in 
February 2009, claiming that it owned the photograph’s copyright and asked Fairey for credit 
and compensation for his copyright infringement.38 In response, Fairey filed a lawsuit against the 
AP seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.39 Fairey claimed that his works did not infringe the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-arnon/how-the-obama-hope-poster_b_133874.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
28 See Arnon, supra note 27. 
29 Shepard Fairey, The AP, Obama, & Referencing, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shepard-fairey/the-ap-obama-referencing_b_179562.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2010). 
30 Complaint, supra note 26, at 7. for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 7, Fairey, 2009 WL 319564, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/1. 
31 Id. 
32 Edgers, supra note 26. 
33 National Portrait Gallery, Collections, Now on View: Portrait of President Barack Obama by Shepard Fairey, 
http://www.npg.si.edu/collection/obamaportrait.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). 
34 Tom Gralish, Scene on the Road, Mystery Solved! The Obama Poster Photographer ID’d, 
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/2009/01/mystery_solved_the_obama_poste.html (Jan. 14, 2009) 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
35 Reuters Blogs, Iconic Obama Poster Based on Reuters Photo – or Was It?, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/photo/2009/01/15/iconic-obama-poster-based-on-reuters-photo, (Jan. 15, 2009, 13:39 EST) 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
36 Gralish, supra note 34. 
37 Id.;. see Appendix infra. 
38 Hillel Italie, AP Alleges Copyright Infringement of Obama Image, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2009, 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn_020409a.html; Paul Colford, AP Statement on Shepard Fairey 
Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb 9, 2009, http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_020409a.html.statement. 
39 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1, Fairey v. Associated Press, 2009 WL 319564, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
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AP’s copyright and that the works were protected by the fair use doctrine.40 The AP filed its 
answers to Fairey’s complaint, and asserted counterclaims that it owned a copyright registration 
in the Obama photograph41 and that Fairey’s use of the photograph without the AP’s consent 
violated the Copyright Act of 1976.42 The AP also argued that Fairey could not use the fair use 
doctrine because he wholly replicated the AP’s Obama photograph for Fairey’s own commercial 
benefit.43 Fairey’s answer to the AP’s counterclaim raised the First Amendment as an affirmative 
defense.44 
 
After these initial pleadings, a factual conflict emerged over the visual reference of 
Fairey’s Obama Hope. Fairey claimed that he found the photograph in which Senator Obama and 
George Clooney were both in the frame (“Clooney Photo”) but that he used only Obama’s image 
as a visual reference.45 Fairey stated that he slightly adjusted Obama’s eyes and rotated Obama’s 
head, which made Obama in the Clooney Photo look a little out of sync with his Obama Hope 
image.46 Alleging this was a deliberate misrepresentation, the AP asserted that a different Obama 
photograph was the source of Fairey’s image.47 The true image (“Obama Photo”),48 according to 
the AP, did not include George Clooney. The AP contended that Fairey deliberately 
misidentified the Clooney Photo as the true source so that he could argue that he substantially 
changed the AP’s original work.49 In his answer to the AP’s counterclaim, Fairey denied the 
accusation.50 
 
Freelance photographer Mannie Garcia also claimed that he owned the copyright in the 
Obama Photo, obtained a Federal Certificate of Registration,51 and filed a motion to join the suit 
                                                                                                                                                             
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/1. 
40 Id. at 10-11. 
41 Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, Associated Press, at 25-26, Fairey v. Associated 
Press, 2009 WL 648762, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/13. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Id. at 13-14. 
44 Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants at 20, Fairey v. Associated Press, 
2009 WL 1116249, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/21/. 
45 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1, Fairey v. Associated Press, 2009 WL 319564, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/1; Interview by Terry Gross with Shepard Fairey, National Public Radio (Feb. 
2009) [hereinafter Fairey Interview], transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=101182453 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
46 Fairey Interview, supra note 45. 
47 Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, the Associated Press at 42-43, Fairey v. 
Associated Press,, 2009 WL 648762, at *42-43 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/13. 
48 See Appendix. 
49 Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, supra note 41, at 42-43.  Answer, Affirmative Defenses and 
Counterclaims of Defendant, the Associated Press at 42-43, Fairey, 2009 WL 648762, at *42-43 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 
2009). 
50 Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants at 14, Fairey v. Associated Press, 
2009 WL 1116249, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/21. 
51 Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor Mannie Garcia's Motion to Intervene at 4, Fairey v. Associated 
Press, 2009 WL 2142921, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
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as a defendant.52 In addition, Garcia answered Fairey’s complaint and asserted counterclaims 
against Fairey and cross-claims against the AP. 53  Garcia sought compensation for Fairey’s 
infringement of the copyright that Garcia held in the registered Obama Photo.54  He also claimed 
that he was not an employee of the AP and that he did not assign his copyrights in the 
photographs to the AP.55 
 
 In another twist, Fairey filed a motion to amend his complaint regarding the identity of 
the Obama photograph he used in October 2009.56 Fairey admitted that he was “mistaken” about 
the photograph he used and that he “attempt[ed] to delete the electronic files he had used in 
creating the illustration” of his Obama Hope image.57 The real photograph he used as a visual 
reference was not the Clooney Photo, but the Obama Photo (without Clooney) as the AP 
claimed.58 On his OBEY website, Fairey wrote that he discovered his mistake early on in this 
legal dispute and that he attempted to conceal the fact that he submitted false images.59 However, 
in its answer to Fairey’s amended complaint, the AP attacked the word “mistake” that Fairey 
emphasized, and suggested that it was another lie to cover up his initial lie and doubted any 
genuine mistake.60 
 
In November 2009, District Judge Alvin Hellerstein permitted Fairey to switch lawyers 
despite the AP’s objection.61 It is reported that Judge Hellerstein “called Fairey’s acknowledged 
wrongdoing a ‘serious transgression,’ but also said [Hellerstein] wanted ‘this case to be decided 
on the merits.’”62 In August 2010, jury selection and trial opening statements were set for March 
21, 2011.63 Pursuant to Fairey’s claims stated above, this article will consider whether Fairey’s 
Obama Hope infringed the AP’s copyright, whether the Obama Hope is protected by the fair use 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/28. 
52 Id. at 1. 
53 Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims and Cross Claims of Defendant-Intervenor Mannie Garcia at 1, 
Fairey v. Associated Press, 2009 WL 2350883, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/33. 
54 Id. at 16-18. 
55 Id. at 9-10. 
56 Motion to Amend Pleadings at 2-3, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 CIV 01123 (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 
2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123),), http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/41.  
57 Id. at 2. 
58 Id. 
59 Shepard Fairey, Statement on Associated Press Fair Use Case, OBEY GIANT, Oct. 16, 2009, http://obeygiant. 
com/headlines/associated-press-fair-use-case (last visited Oct. 26, 2009)supra note 13. 
60 The Associated Press's First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims at 55-56, Fairey v. 
Associated Press, 2009 WL 3991104, at *55-56 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/54/. 
61 Hillel Italie, Judge: ‘HOPE’ Artist Can Switch Lawyers in AP Suit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 10, 2009, 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn_111009b.html (noting new attorneys included director of the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University); see Case Management Order at 2, Fairey v. Associated Press, 
No. 09 CIV 01123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123),), http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/61/ (noting Case Management Plan). 
62 Italie, supra note 61 (noting that Judge Hellerstein reserved motions to sanction until the case was resolved); see 
Paul Colford, AP Statement: AP Pleased the Court Considers Spoilation and Fabrication of Evidence Serious, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/wn_111009c.html. 
63 Press Releases, Trial Date Set in AP-Artist Dispute in NYC, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2010, 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn_082310a.html. 
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doctrine, and whether the First Amendment applies to Fairey’s case. Moreover, although 
Fairey’s bad faith, and the relationship between the AP and Garcia might have significant impact 
on the trial, this article will focus on the copyright dispute between Fairey and the AP on the 
merits. 
 
II. Copyright and Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
 
A. The Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act 
 
The Copyright Clause (Article I, Section 8) of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress has the enumerated power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”64 Acting on this power, the first Congress passed a bill to protect 
copyright, which President George Washington signed as the Copyright Act of 1790.65 Since 
then, Congress has amended and revised the statutes several times.66 The Copyright Act of 1976 
is the last omnibus revision, which is still the general codification today.67 
 
B. Copyrightable Works 
 
1. Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides a copyright owner with a bundle of 
exclusive rights such as the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work” 
and the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”68 However, under section 102, 
such copyright protection for an original work is limited to “tangible medium of expression,” and 
does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”69 This idea/expression dichotomy protects an original author’s expression, while 
permitting others to freely use the ideas and information conveyed by the original work.70 For 
instance, the idea of a boy who finds out he is a wizard and attends a school of wizards and 
witches where he faces a dark wizard who killed his parents, might not be protected by the Act. 
On the other hand, using substantial amount of “direct quotations or paraphrases, plot details, or 
summaries of scenes” from the Harry Potter books could be considered copying of the original 
author’s protected expression.71 
 
2. Originality Requirement 
 
 Not every expression is copyrightable. The Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century 
                                                 
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
65 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:19 (2009). 
66 1-OV MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § Overview (Matthew Bender 2009).  
67 1 PATRY, supra note 65, § 1:71. 
68 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
69 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
70 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
71 Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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concluded that originality was not only a statutory but also a constitutional requirement.72 Under 
the Copyright Act, for the expression of the work to be copyrightable, an author’s expression has 
to be “original.”73 The U.S. Supreme Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service held 
that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.”74 “Original,” in terms of copyright, means 
that “the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied [sic] from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”75 While the “requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low” and even a slight amount of creativity is sufficient, 
“[o]riginality does not signify novelty” and fortuitous resemblance is still original.76  
 
 Although facts and ideas are not protected as original works, factual compilations may be 
sufficiently original to obtain protection.77 Indeed, section 103 of the Copyright Act provides that 
the subject matter of copyright includes compilations.78 A “compilation” is defined as “a work 
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original 
work of authorship.”79 Thus, the choices as to selection and arrangement could be original and 
copyrightable if they are independently compiled and minimally creative.80 
 
 However, because the facts themselves are not original, the copyright in such 
compilations is considered “thin.”81 For example, Plaintiff telephone service company in Feist 
published a telephone directory by listing names and telephone numbers of the subscribers in 
alphabetical order, while Defendant publisher used some of that list and also added the street 
addresses.82 The Court found that the telephone company’s directory was a sort of “selection,” 
but that merely alphabetizing the names is not original because it lacked the creativity “necessary 
to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.” 83  This application of a “thin” 
copyright is likely to be a key to the Obama Hope case. 
 
C. Copyright of Photographs 
 
 Since the Copyright Act of March 3, 1865, 84  photographs have enjoyed copyright 
protection.85 In 1884, the Supreme Court held in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony that 
                                                 
72 Id. at 346-47 (noting that definition of the terms “authors” and “writings” in the Copyright Clause presupposes a 
degree of originality) (citing Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 84 (1879) and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). 
73 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (“[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
74 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis original). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 348. 
78 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). 
79 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005). 
80 Feist, Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
81 Id. at 349. 
82 Id. at 342-44. 
83 Id. at 362-63. 
84 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch.126, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (1865); see PATRY, supra note 55, § 1:31  (noting that “Civil War 
photographs . . . had a dramatic effect on the public” before Congress passed the bill). 
85 Ets-Hokin v. SKYY Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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“the Constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as 
they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”86 There, the Court 
found a photograph of Oscar Wilde as original.87 The photographer’s artistic choices rendering 
the photograph copyrightable included the posing of Wilde and arrangement of his costumes and 
accessories “so as to present graceful outlines”; the arrangement and disposition of light and 
shade; and the suggestion and evocation of the desired expression.88 Moreover, a photograph’s 
likelihood of obtaining copyright protection is not affected by whether the photograph is used in 
“a museum, an art gallery, a mural, a magazine, or an advertisement.”89 
 
 As discussed in Section B, the Supreme Court held in Feist that the requisite degree of 
creativity is “extremely low.”90 Since the standard of originality for photographs is also low, 
almost any photograph can pass the originality test.91 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, applied this lowered standard, ruling that “[e]lements of originality in a photograph may 
include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired 
expression, and almost any other variant involved.”92 Accordingly, news photographers, who 
have little control over the subject, could still satisfy this standard if they specifically chose the 
particular camera, adjusted camera’s angle, selected the right timing, and the like. 
 
D. Standard of Review 
 
To establish copyright infringement, Plaintiff authors must prove (1) the “ownership of a 
valid copyright” and (2) the alleged infringer’s “copying of constituent elements of the work” (3) 
that are original. 93  As for the first element, under section 410 of the Copyright Act, “the 
certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright.” 94  However, the 
presumption of validity may be rebutted if, for example, the work is not original.95 Note that 
although “such registration is not a condition of copyright protection,”96 the Copyright Act 
incentivizes copyright owners to register with the Copyright Office especially because “no civil 
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until 
preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made.”97 
 
Turning to the second element, the authors must show that the alleged infringers “actually 
copied” the original author’s works.98 Actual copying “may be established by direct or indirect 
evidence.”99 In addition to actual copying, the authors must demonstrate that there is “substantial 
                                                 
86 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
87 Id. at 60.  
88 Id. 
89 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1075. 
90 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
91 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77. 
92 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
93 See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-64). 
94 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976). 
95 Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991). 
96 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005). 
97 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2008); see U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Basics, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1.pdf. 
98 Boisson, 273 F.3d at 267-68. 
99 Id. at 267 (“[i]ndirect evidence may include proof of ‘access to the copyrighted work, similarities that are 
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similarity” between the protectable elements of his or her original works and the secondary 
works. 100  This requirement means that even when there is actual copying, “no legal 
consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.”101 Although “actual” 
copying requires only that the infringing works copy something from the protected works, 
“actionable” copying (substantial similarity) requires that the copying be both qualitatively and 
quantitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion of copyright infringement. 102  “The 
qualitative component concerns the copying of expression,” while “quantitative component 
generally concerns the amount [and sometimes observability] of the copyrighted work that is 
copied.”103 
 
 The Second Circuit admitted that determining such “substantial similarity” to prove 
copyright infringement, “presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one 
which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations.”104 Nonetheless, based on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of “thin” originality in Feist, it seems clear that “more similarity is required 
when less protectible matter is at issue.”105 There is no precise threshold or bright line for 
substantiality.106 The test for substantial similarity varies by jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit recognizes that creative expression in the original work can receive only limited 
protection when the similarity between the copyrightable elements and the secondary works are 
de minimis.107 Employing this sliding scale approach, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[w]hen the 
range of protectable and unauthorized expression is narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit 
copying is virtual identity.”108 
 
More importantly, as the federal court that covers New York, the Second Circuit 
generally determines substantial similarity by using the ordinary observer test: “whether an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the 
copyrighted work.”109 Yet the Second Circuit also relies on the “thin” analysis.110 When the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
probative of copying between the works, and expert testimony.’” (citation omitted)). 
100 Id. at 267-68; see Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[i]f actual copying is 
established, a plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an improper appropriation by demonstrating that 
substantial similarity to protected material exists between the two works”). 
101 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 13.03[A]. 
102 Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). 
103 Id. 
104 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 
105 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 13.03[A]. 
106 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75-76. 
107 Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). 
108 Id. The Tenth Circuit Court similarly held that “if substantial similarity is the normal measure required to 
demonstrate infringement, ‘supersubstantial’ similarity must pertain when dealing with ‘thin’ works.” Jacobsen v. 
Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir. 2002). 
109 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 
1022 (2d Cir. 1966)). The court also described the test in another way, asking whether “the ordinary observer, unless 
he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the 
same.” Id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).  
110 See, e.g., Beaudin v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., 95 F.3d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[w]here the quantum of 
originality is slight and the resulting copyright is ‘thin,’ infringement will be established only by very close copying 
because the majority of the work is unprotectable.”); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g. Enters., Inc., 
945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[t]he appropriate inquiry is narrowed in the case of a compilation. . . . and a 
finding of substantial similarity or even absolute identity as to matters in the public domain will not suffice to prove 
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decided a case involving copyright infringement of carpet designs, the court stated that “[t]here 
may arise visual-arts cases in which the ‘selection, coordination, and arrangement’ . . . is so 
aesthetically complex and sophisticated that the copyright is more than ‘thin.’”111 In that case, 
however, since Plaintiff carpet designer used public domain images (i.e. not under copyright 
protection) for his carpet,112 the court held that “the selective deletion of elements from the 
[public domain image], while idiosyncratic, was relatively simple and supports only a thin 
copyright.”113 But the holding was not that simple. Although the district court decided there was 
no infringement because of the original design’s thin copyright and the significant change made 
by Defendant’s secondary design,114 the Second Circuit vacated the judgment, reasoning that 
Defendant, another carpet designer, “copied the original and ‘particular’ or ‘same’ selections 
embodied” in the original public domain carpet design.115 
 
 As for the third element (material taken is original), “Plaintiffs’ certificates of registration 
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity not only of their copyrights, but also of the 
originality of their works.”116 In addition, as discussed above, the threshold for originality is very 
low. However, courts have clarified that only a particular expression of an idea is copyrightable 
and not every element of copyrighted work is protected.117 “[A]n element within a work may be 
unprotectable even if other elements, or the work as a whole” are original and protected.118  
 
E. Application to the Obama Hope Case 
 
1. The AP Owns Valid Copyright in the Obama Photo 
 
Despite their legal dispute, this article will assume that the AP hired Garcia to take news 
photographs in 2006, and that Garcia assigned the copyright registration in the Obama Photo to 
the AP. Thus, the first issue is whether the AP is a valid copyright owner of the Obama Photo. 
Since the AP holds a copyright registration in the Obama Photo, 119 it presumptively owns a valid 
copyright of the photograph. However, registration of work does not guarantee ownership of a 
valid copyright and the presumption may be rebutted if the Obama Photo is not original.120 
 
2. The Obama Photo Is Original but the Copyright Protection Is “Thin” 
 
 As discussed above, registering the photograph presumptively indicates a photograph’s 
originality. However, the AP could claim originality in the Obama Photo even without 
                                                                                                                                                             
infringement”). 
111 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 n.13 (2d Cir. 2003). 
112 Id. at 129. 
113 Id. at 136 n.13. 
114 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
vacated, 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003). 
115 Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 136-37. 
116 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 268-69. 
119 Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, the Associated Press at 25-26, Fairey v. 
Associated Press, WL 648762, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/13. 
120 See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 267-68. 
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registration. Garcia explained that while he was on the AP’s assignment to cover George 
Clooney at the National Press Club, Garcia waited for Senator Obama “to turn his head a little 
bit . . . patiently making a few pictures here and there . . . looking for a moment” that Garcia 
thought was just right.121 Garcia expressed the right moment as: ““…and then it happened. Boom, 
I was there. I was ready.”122 Of course, Garcia did not pose Obama, choose the lighting, or 
arrange the background, but he decided the timing, chose to focus on Obama rather than Clooney, 
selected the particular camera and lens, and finally chose to submit that particular picture out of 
the many images he took that night.123 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York ruled that selection of film, camera, lens, and filter would not alone make the photograph 
original. 124  Nonetheless, considering the low requisite level for originality, Garcia’s Obama 
Photo is likely original.125 
 
 However, the entire Obama Photo may not be necessarily protected.126 Here kicks in the 
“thin” analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Feist. There are several reasons to believe that 
the Obama Photo is like the telephone directory compilation where the protectable expression is 
limited. First, as an elected official, Senator Obama was certainly a public figure and not an 
exclusive image for one particular entity, like the AP. Obama was rather a fact and a familiar 
idea, analogous to a telephone number. In addition, news reporting is very factual.  
 
Second, as seen in Part I, there was initial confusion over Fairey’s referenced photograph. 
Even Garcia conceded that he did not recognize his own photograph,127 implying that anybody 
could have produced a similar image and thus the “merger doctrine” may be applicable. “Under 
the merger doctrine, courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the idea 
underlying the copyrighted work can be expressed in only one way, lest there be a monopoly on 
the underlying idea.” 128  The Second Circuit prefers that the merger doctrine applies “in 
determining whether actionable infringement has occurred, rather than whether a copyright is 
valid.”129 
 
Third, although the low originality threshold will help the Obama Photo attain protection, 
Garcia’s limited control over the subject may make the originality of the Photo “thin.” Under the 
circumstances of the panel discussion, it is clear that only Senator Obama had control over his 
expression, conveying his image of hope, wisdom, future, and leadership, which Fairey later 
                                                 
121 Interview by Terry Gross with Mannie Garcia, National Public Radio (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter Garcia Interview], 
transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=101184444 (last visited Jan. 
15, 2010). 
122 Id. 
123 Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims and Cross Claims of Defendant-Intervenor Mannie Garcia at 14, 
Fairey v. Associated Press, 2009 WL 2350883, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009)(No. 09 Civ. 01123), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/33. 
124 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
125 Ets-Hokin v. SKYY Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000). 
126 See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001). 
127 Garcia Interview, supra note 121. 
128 See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082. 
129 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); Cf. Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 
F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[t]here may be highly unusual cases in which virtually all of an idea’s possible 
expressions are before a district court at the copyrightability stage. In such rare cases it may perhaps be possible to 
determine the merger issue while deciding whether a given expression is copyrightable”).  
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emphasized in his Obama Hope image.130 Garcia’s protected expression in the Obama Photo 
seems limited to an angle of Obama’s face, lighting and focus of the entire image, and the ratio 
of the photograph. Accordingly, thin originality of the Obama Photo will likely leave many 
elements of the photograph unprotected. 
 
3. Comparison with Rogers v. Koons 
 
Fairey’s confession that he “actually” copied the AP’s Obama Photo for his Obama 
Hope131 raises the next question on whether his copying is “actionable.” As stated above, this 
answer depends on whether there is substantial similarity between the protectable elements of the 
Obama Photo and the Obama Hope.132 Since the copyrightable expression in the Obama Photo is 
very “thin,” the similarity may need to be “supersubstantial,” if not identical.133 
 
 This argument explains why the AP and Fairey battled over the reference of Fairey’s 
Obama Hope image despite seemingly little difference between the Obama Photo and the 
Clooney Photo. In its answer to Fairey’s amended counterclaim, the AP denounced that “by 
claiming to have used the Clooney Photo, Fairey was attempting to argue that he made more 
changes to the AP’s copyrighted image than he actually did . . . and that he took a less substantial 
portion of the original than he did in reality.”134 If Fairey had really used Obama’s image cut out 
of the Clooney Photo and adjusted Obama’s eyes, the similarity between the original and 
secondary images would be less substantial. On the other hand, if a lay person compares the 
Obama Photo to the Obama Hope poster, that lay person may well find the two works 
substantially similar as a matter of fact.135 
 
 However, as a matter of law, Fairey can still rely on the idea/expression dichotomy 
through the “thin” approach from Feist. His claim may receive support by distinguishing this 
case from a similar appropriation art case, Rogers v. Koons, in which the Second Circuit held 
that there was copyright infringement.136 In that case, Plaintiff, professional photographer, took a 
photograph of a married couple with eight puppies (“Puppies”),137 based on which Defendant 
appropriation artist then created a sculpture (“String of Puppies”). 138  The court found that 
Puppies was original, that Plaintiff owned a copyright in Puppies, that Defendant actually copied 
the original work, and that there was substantial similarity between the two works. 139 
                                                 
130 See Fairey Interview, supra note 45. 
131 Motion to Amend Pleadings at 2-4, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 CIV 01123, (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 
2009)(No. 09 CIV 01123), http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/41.  
132 See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 267-68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
133 See Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir. 2002); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 
F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). 
134 Notice of Motion of the Associated Press’s Motion for Leave to Amend Answer, Affirmative Defenses and 
Counterclaims Pursuant to Rule 15(a) and Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 56, Fairey v. 
Associated Press, No. 09 CIV 01123 (S.D.N.Y. October 20, 2009)(No. 09 CIV 01123), 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/42.  
135 See Appendix infra. 
136 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308. (2d Cir. 1992). 
137 Id. at 303-04. 
138 Id. at 304-05. 
139 Id. at 307-08. 
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Superficially, it seems this decision could have somewhat negative implications for Fairey, but 
important distinctions could strengthen Fairey’s argument. 
 
 First, Defendant in Rogers created a sculpture by “faithfully” imitating Plaintiff’s 
photograph expression “as per photo.”140 Although Fairey may also have closely followed the 
expressions in the Obama Photo, the appropriation seems justified given the photo’s minimal 
originality, in which the expression almost “merges” with the photograph’s idea of Senator 
Obama.141 Since there were only a few ways to express the photograph’s ideas, Fairey could 
hardly modify the original expression. Second, the original Puppies photograph in Rogers 
depicting a married couple sitting on a bench and holding eight new German Shepherd puppies, 
seems to have “thick” originality because of the creative and unique expression. 142  This 
protection may be supported by the fact that somebody familiar with the picture immediately 
recognized it as a copy. 143  On the contrary, Garcia himself did not realize that his own 
photograph was used even when the Obama Hope image was everywhere during the presidential 
election season.144 Third, when Plaintiff in Rogers took the Puppies photograph, he “drew on his 
years of artistic development” and controlled the subjects.145 Garcia may have used his artistic 
skills when he took the Obama Photo and selected one of the photographs to submit to the AP, 
but his use of artistic leeway was very limited. Garcia described the restricted and forced 
condition in which he took photographs of Obama, stating, “it was at the Press Club, and there’s 
nothing glorious about this room. It’s a very tiny, cramped room, and we were crammed in there, 
and I’m literally on my knees in front of the table.”146 It is reasonable to believe that Obama 
entirely controlled his own expression and the photographers could not have taken the 
photographs much differently. 
 
4.  Similarity Between Obama Photo and Obama Hope Is not Substantial 
 
In comparing the Rogers case with the Fairey case, the court should hold that there is no 
substantial similarity between the Obama Photo and the Obama Hope. Although Fairey used the 
entire Obama Photo, he made it into a collage by playing with colors of red, white, and blue; 
eliminating facial lines; creating geometric shapes; and adding bold “HOPE” lettering.147 The 
sliding scale test would lead a court to find that the Obama Hope is sufficiently distinct from the 
Obama Photo because the original copyrighted expression is thin. Under the ordinary observer 
test adopted by the Second Circuit, in contrasting the Obama Hope image with the protectable 
elements of the Obama Photo, it is likely that an average observer -- even the original 
photographer himself -- would not recognize the Obama Hope as appropriated from the 
copyrighted Obama Photo.148 Accordingly, Fairey should succeed in his argument that there is 
                                                 
140 Id. at 307. 
141 See Ets-Hokin v. SKYY Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
142 See Appendix infra. 
143 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305. 
144 Garcia Interview, supra note 121. 
145 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304 (“[h]e selected the light, the location, the bench on which the [couple] is seated and 
the arrangement of the small dogs. He also made creative judgments concerning technical matters with his camera 
and the use of natural light.”). 
146 Garcia Interview, supra note 121. 
147 William Booth, Making Political Art, WASH. POST, May 19, 2008, at M06. 
148 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307-08. 
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no copyright infringement. 
 
III. The Copyright Act and the Fair Use Doctrine 
 
A. Fair Use Defense 
 
 Even where a court holds that there is substantial similarity between original and 
secondary works, the statutory fair use defense “allows the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.”149 Section 
107 of the Copyright Act sets forth four factors for consideration in fair use: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.150 
 
The preamble to the section enumerates some examples of potential fair use “such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research.”151 
 
 “From the infancy of copyright protection,” before the fair use doctrine was codified as 
an affirmative defense in the Copyright Act of 1976, “some opportunity for fair use of 
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose”152 under 
the Copyright Clause in order “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”153 Congress 
intended that the traditional fair use doctrine both permit and require courts to avoid rigid 
application of copyright protection when the black letter law stifles the very purpose that the law 
was designed to foster.154 Moreover, section 107 does not attempt to define fair use or provide a 
rule that may automatically determine what particular use is deemed fair.155 Without any bright-
line rules under the statute, courts must determine fair use on a case-by-case basis, considering 
the totality of circumstances.156 One commentator observed that “each of the [four] factors is 
defined in only the most general terms, so that courts are left with almost complete discretion in 
determining whether any given factor is present in any particular case.”157 
 
                                                 
149 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
150 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
151 Id. 
152 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
153 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
154 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
155 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 13.05[A]. 
156 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) 
(“no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts”). 
157 4-13 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 13.05[A]. 
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B. Earlier Use of Fair Use 
 
 Until the early 1990s, it seems that courts emphasized economic aspects when judges 
applied the fair use doctrine. The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc. held that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair 
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”158 The Court 
in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises followed the emphasis on economic 
aspect of Sony Corp., stating that the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market, 
was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”159 
 
 In Harper, Defendant publisher published a short article, using portions of Plaintiff’s 
unpublished manuscript of an autobiography written by former President Gerald Ford.160 As a 
result, Plaintiff publisher lost out on a prior agreement with Time Magazine for sale of the 
memoir’s exclusive publication rights.161 The Second Circuit held that Defendant’s publication 
was fair use partly because “the purpose of the article was news reporting” under the first 
factor.162 The Supreme Court reversed. Although the Court acknowledged that Defendant’s news 
reporting purpose was one of the examples enumerated in section 107,163 the Court stressed that 
“[Defendant’s] use had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting 
the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publication.”164 
 
Emphasis among the four fair use factors apparently shifted soon after Judge Pierre Leval 
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York wrote an influential article for 
the Harvard Law Review in 1990. 165  As discussed below, his most important contribution was 
introduction of “transformative use.” In short, for secondary use to be considered fair, it is 
crucial that the secondary user adds new meaning and different purpose to the original work. 
 
C. Recent Use of Fair Use and Courts’ Application 
 
1. First Factor - The Purpose and Character of the Secondary Use 
 
In considering the first factor of fair use (the purpose and character of the secondary use), 
courts “must weigh the strength of the secondary user’s justification against the copyright 
owner’s interest.” 166  Specifically, Judge Leval pointed out that the key question to such 
justification would be “whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”167 The 
“transformative use” must employ the original work “in a different manner or for a different 
                                                 
158 Harper, 471 U.S. at 562. 
159 Id. at 566-67. 
160 Id. at 542. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 545. 
163 Id. at 561. 
164 Id. at 562 (emphasis in original). 
165 See 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 
1:25 (3d ed. 2009); see also NIMMER, supra note 66, § 13.05[1][b]. 
166 Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
167 Id. 
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purpose from the original.”168  Thus, as Judge Leval wrote, the secondary work is unlikely 
transformative if it “merely repackages or republishes the original.”169 On the other hand, if the 
secondary work adds value by using the original work “as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings[,] this is the very 
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”170  
 
Adopting the transformative use doctrine in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the Supreme 
Court framed the central purpose of the inquiry under the first factor as determining “whether the 
new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”171 Judge Leval conceded that transformation does not guarantee success 
in winning fair use arguments. 172  In this regard, while the Supreme Court held that 
“transformative use is not absolutely necessary,” it concluded that “the goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”173 
The Court further emphasized the importance of transformation, ruling that “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”174 
 
 In Campbell, rap music group 2 Live Crew wrote a song, “Pretty Woman,” which was a 
parody of Roy Orbison’s original song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”175 The Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment for Plaintiff copyright holder, reasoning that the Sixth Circuit erred in applying the old 
presumption that commercial use of copyrighted material was unfair. 176  In overruling the 
decision, the Court stated that many non-infringing activities would constitute commercial use, 
including even those illustrated in section 107 of the Copyright Act, and that “the mere fact that a 
use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more 
than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness.”177 Then the Court held that 
Defendant’s Pretty Woman was a transformative work since it could reasonably perceive the 
parody song as commenting on and criticizing the original work.178 
 
After the Supreme Court adopted transformative use in Campbell, the Second Circuit 
started emphasizing transformative use when determining the first factor of fair use.179 The court 
ruled that the first factor is the “heart” of fair use 180  and it stressed the importance of 
transformative nature of the work for this factor.181 Specifically, the court found a transformative 
use when Defendant used the original work as raw material “in the furtherance of distinct 




171 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at569, 579. (1994). 
172 Leval, supra note 166, at 1111-12. 
173 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 572. 
176 Id. at 583-84. 
177 Id. at 584. 
178 Id. at 583. 
179 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006). 
180 Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001). 
181 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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creative or communicative objectives.”182 On the other hand, the Second Circuit “declined to 
find a transformative use when the defendant has done no more than find a new way to exploit 
the creative virtues of the original work.”183 
 
Also it may be important to note that although a court might weigh-in Defendant’s “bad 
faith,” it is not dispositive for determining fair use.184 The Second Circuit in NXIVM Corp. v. 
Ross Institute thoroughly explored the question of bad faith in a fair use argument and concluded 
that “even if the bad faith subfactor weighs in plaintiffs’ favor, the first factor still favors 
defendants in light of the transformative nature of the secondary use as criticism.”185 This ruling 
might at least ease Fairey’s admission about his “mistake.”  
 
2. Second Factor - The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 
 As Judge Leval pointed out, it seems that courts only superficially and barely discuss the 
second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work. 186  Instead of analyzing the statutory 
language’s plain meaning, Leval directed attention to Justice Story’s reference to the “value of 
the materials used.”187  Leval noted the latter “suggests that some protected matter is more 
‘valued’ under copyright law than others.”188 He summarized that the second factor concerns 
“protection of the reasonable expectation” of the original author/creator.189 It follows that “the 
more the copyrighted matter is at the center of the protected concerns of the copyright law, the 
more the other factors, including justification, must favor the secondary user in order to earn a 
fair use finding.”190 
 
 The Supreme Court also used Justice Story’s words in Campbell, and recognized that 
“some [original] works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others,” 
where it is more difficult for the Court to find fair use when the secondary work merely copied 
the original work.191 In that case, the Court held that the first line and bass riff of the original 
song were the author’s creative expression that fell within “the core of the copyright’s protected 
purposes.”192 However, the Court concluded this factor was not helpful to determine fair use 
because parodies almost invariably copy the original author’s creative work.193 
 
 The Second Circuit in Blanch v. Koons helpfully characterized two types of distinctions 
regarding the nature of copyrighted works in evaluating the second factor: “(1) whether the work 
is expressive or creative . . . or more factual . . . and (2) whether the work is published or 
                                                 
182 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253. 
183 Id. at 252. 
184 NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478-79 (2d Cir. 2004). 
185 Id. 
186 Leval, supra note 166, at 1116. 
187 Id. at 1117 (citation omitted). 
188 Id. (citation omitted). 
189 Id. at 1122. 
190 Id. 
191 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at569, 586 (1994) (citing various cases to illustrate the “core” works 
and their copies). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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unpublished.”194  Consequently, the creative nature of the original work typically favors the 
copyright holder.195 Nonetheless, the second factor’s usefulness may be limited when the original 
creative work is used for a transformative purpose.196 
 
3. Third Factor - The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
 
 To determine the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the original portion used, a 
court examines both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the secondary work, 197  asking 
whether “the quantity and value of the materials used are reasonable” for the purpose of the 
copying.198 As the Supreme Court noted, “the extent of permissible copying varies with the 
purpose and character of the use.”199 For example, the copying is “not fair use when more of the 
original is copied than necessary.”200 However, even copying an entire work does not necessarily 
weigh against fair use because it is sometimes inevitable.201 Additionally, Judge Leval stated the 
third factor has further significance in consideration of the first and fourth factors.202 In assessing 
justification under the first factor, “an important inquiry is whether the selection and quantity of 
the material taken are reasonable in relation to the purported justification.”203 In relation to the 
market effect under the fourth factor, which is discussed more below, the qualitative aspect of 
substantiality “can assist in the assessment of the likely impact on the market for the copyrighted 
work.”204 Regarding the relation between the third and fourth factors, the Supreme Court agreed 
that “a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or 
changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original 
[market].”205 
 
 For example, Defendant in Harper copied only part of President Ford’s memoir, but the 
newsworthiness and licensability of the copied portions constituted “the heart of the book.”206 
Since “a taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial [in amount] with respect to 
the infringing work,” the Court held that what Defendant copied was not a “meager” or an 
“infinitesimal” amount of original Ford’s language. 207  On the other hand, 2 Live Crew in 
Campbell did copy the opening part of the original song, but thereafter markedly departed from it.  
Hence, using a substantial portion of Plaintiff’s song was not necessarily copying.208 
 
                                                 
194 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d at244, 256. (2d Cir. 2006). 
195 Id. (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
196 Id. 
197 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613. 
198 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257. 
199 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at569, 586-87 (1994). 
200 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at301, 311. (2d Cir. 1992). 
201 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613. 
202 Leval, supra note 166, at 1123. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1994) (also noting that “[t]he facts bearing on this factor 
will also tend to address the fourth, by revealing the degree to which the [secondary work] may serve as a market 
substitute for the original or potentially licensed derivatives”).  
206 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554-56. (1985). 
207 Id. 
208 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89. 
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4. Fourth Factor - Effect on the Market 
 
 In analyzing the fourth factor, effect of the use on the market, a court needs to consider 
not only the extent of actual market harm caused by the alleged infringement but also “‘whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”209 Similar to other factors, 
the Supreme Court noted that “[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this 
factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the 
showing on the other factors.”210 In particular, the Court mentioned that if the secondary use is 
transformative, “market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so 
readily inferred.”211 The Court’s ruling reflected Judge Leval’s notion212 that the fourth factor 
should weigh against finding fair use “only when the market is impaired because the quoted 
material serves the consumer as a substitute, or, in [Justice] Story’s words ‘supersede[s] the use 
of the original’”213 Simply put, if each work serves different purposes, “it is more likely that the 
new work will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, 
by acting as a substitute for it.”214 A transformative work would not become a substitute for the 
original work.  
 
The Second Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier emphasis 
on the fourth factor.215 Following the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth factor, the 
Second Circuit looked to actual market harm and to “whether[] if the challenged use becomes 
widespread, it will adversely affect the potential market for copyrighted work.”216 In one case, 
the court described, “our concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys 
the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps 
the market of the original work.”217 This distinction indicates that courts do not care even if 
lethal parody or harsh criticism might destroy demand for the original work; courts only consider 
market substitution effects where the original and the secondary works compete in the same 
market.218 The court also tries to balance between the benefit that the public receives if the 
secondary use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner receives if the use is 
denied.219 
 
A somewhat uncertain question is how to measure the market effect. Courts are cautious 
about being too deferential to the impact on potential licensing revenues.220 Since secondary 
                                                 
209 Id. at 590. 
210 Id. at 591 n.21. 
211 Id. at 591. 
212 Id. (also noting that the original and parody songs “usually serve different market functions”). 
213 Leval, supra note 166, at 1125 (alteration in original). 
214 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
215 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006). Regarding the earlier interpretation, Judge Leval had 
cautioned that “the Supreme Court ha[d] somewhat overstated its importance.” Leval, supra note 166, at 1124. 
216 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568. (1985)). 
217 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to develop.”). 
218 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-93. 
219 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613. 
220 Id. at 614. 
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users “copy” the original work without paying the fee, the fourth factor would always favor the 
copyright holder.221 Thus, instead courts must look at the impact on “potential licensing revenues 
for ‘traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.’”222 When the original work and 
the secondary work are transformatively different, “a copyright holder cannot prevent others 
from entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing or licensing parody, news reporting, 
educational or other transformative uses of its own creative work.’”223  
 
For example, in Campbell, the copyright holder contended that there was a rap market 
because Defendant recorded a rap parody and another rap group sought a license for a different 
rap derivative.224 But the Court rejected the claim, reasoning that “there was no evidence that a 
potential [non-parody] rap market was harmed in any way by [Defendant’s] parody, rap 
version.”225 After all, “the only harm to derivatives that need concern [the Court] . . . is the harm 
of market substitution.”226 
 
5. Second Circuit’s Decisions in Recent Appropriation Cases 
 
 In 2006, the Second Circuit decided two visual appropriation cases and found fair use for 
both Defendants. It is possible that Fairey had these cases in mind when he chose to file a suit in 
New York. One case is Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley, Ltd., another is Blanch v. 
Koons. 
 
(1) Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley, Ltd. 
 
 Defendant publisher in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley, Ltd. published a 
biography of a famous music group using the group’s concert posters to create graphic images in 
the book.227 Plaintiff copyright holder of the posters refused permission of the use but Defendant 
appropriated seven images which became “displayed in significantly reduced form and [] 
accompanied by captions describing the concerts they represent.”228 As for the first fair use 
factor, since Defendant used the posters for its biography, plainly different from the original 
works’ purpose of artistic expression and promotion, the court found its use transformative.229 
The manner of the images’ display in the book strengthened that conclusion since the images 
were significantly reduced in size, made reproductions combined with texts and other images, 
used a collage effect, and the like.230 
 
The court found that the second and the third factors have limited weight in its fair use 
analysis because Defendant’s use of the original work was for the transformative purpose.231 It 
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222 Id. at 613. 
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224 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593. 
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also emphasized Defendant’s reduced-size reproductions of the original images even though they 
were entirely copied.232 In terms of the fourth factor, since Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s original 
images fell within a transformative market, Plaintiff did not suffer market harm as a result of 
losing license fees.233 
 
(2) Blanch v. Koons 
 
Defendant appropriation artist (the same artist who created String of Puppies) in Blanch v. 
Koons created a collage painting by copying part of the original copyrighted photograph taken by 
Plaintiff fashion photographer. 234  Plaintiff’s photograph appeared in Allure magazine, and 
“depicted a woman’s lower legs and feet.”235 Defendant scanned the original photograph into his 
computer and created the collage image by discarding background and altering the 
appearance. 236  Defendant sold the painting to Deutsche Bank, which displayed it at the 
Guggenheim Museum.237 
 
In weighing the first fair use factor, the court concluded that Defendant’s work 
constituted transformative use because he used Plaintiff’s photograph from a beauty magazine 
and then changed the image’s size and appearance and received commission fee for exhibition in 
the art gallery.238 Despite the profitability of Defendant’s secondary work, the court discounted 
its commercial nature since the new work was substantially transformative.239 The court found 
that the second factor did not have significant implication for the overall fair use analysis 
because, again, Defendant’s work had a transformative purpose.240 
 
The court concluded that the third factor weighed distinctly in Defendant’s favor because 
his copying was reasonable in light of his transformative purpose “to convey the fact of the 
photograph to viewers of the painting, and in light of the quantity, quality, and importance of the 
material used.”241 Turning to the fourth factor, as Plaintiff admitted that she had not published or 
licensed her original photograph, that she had never licensed her photographs for derivative 
visual works, and that she did not suffer any economic harm from Defendant’s use of her 
photograph, the court held that Defendant’s painting “had no deleterious effect upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”242 
 
D. Application to Obama Hope Case 
 
1. First Factor 
 
                                                 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 614-15. 
234 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246. (2d Cir. 2006). 
235 Id. at 247-48. 
236 Id. at 248. 
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240 Id. at 257. 
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 From Fairey’s words and actions during the presidential campaign, it is apparent that his 
purpose in creating the Obama Hope image was to help the candidacy of Barak Obama by 
stressing Obama’s messages of “hope” and “change.” Believing that Obama’s supporters were 
mainly young and progressive people, Fairey designed the iconic and simple image reflecting 
pop culture.243 On the other hand, the AP used Garcia’s Obama Photo for news reporting in 2006. 
The AP assigned Garcia to take photographs of George Clooney regarding a discussion of the 
human rights crisis in Darfur.244 It is unlikely that the AP, a news agency, intended to use that 
particular photograph to mobilize and inspire voters to support candidate Barack Obama for 
President of the United States. Accordingly, it seems reasonable for the court to hold that 
Fairey’s use of the Obama Photo had a different purpose, meaning, and value, making the two 
works transformatively different. 
 
 In terms of the commercial use, Fairey eventually made some profit by using the AP’s 
Obama Photo.245  However, he did not originally intend to make such a profit, which was 
incidental and only a result of the presidential election. The purpose of Fairey’s use was more 
public than commercial,246 and had “value that benefits the broader public interest.”247 Even 
assuming that Fairey used the Obama Photo for profit, it would not change the fact that the 
Obama Hope image had different meaning and value. Moreover, it seems Fairey had a genuine 
creative rationale for borrowing Garcia’s photograph, “rather than using it merely to get attention 
or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”248 It would have been very difficult for 
Fairey to create Obama’s image without referring to a photograph someone took. 
 
 Thus, the Obama Hope image did not supersede the objects of the original creation but 
“instead add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message.”249 It is also important to take into account Fairey’s 
use of collage in a palette of red, white, and blue with the word “HOPE” as an artistic manner 
and adding new expression. This is analogous to the defendants’ works in the two Second Circuit 
cases discussed above. Therefore, Fairey’s use satisfies the elements of transformative use, 
making the first fair use factor weigh in favor of Fairey. 
 
2. Second Factor 
 
 As discussed in Part II, Garcia’s Obama Photo was creative and original. However, the 
nature of Garcia’s photograph was also factual given that it was originally published for its news 
                                                 
243 See Arnon, supra note 27. 
244 Garcia Interview, supra note 121. 
245 See, e.g., Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants at 2, Fairey v. Associated 
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http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/21/ (admitting that he 
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reporting purpose. A copyrighted work is more subject to fair use when it is published to the 
public.250 Thus, the Obama Photo should receive only “thin” protection and face fair use scrutiny. 
Accordingly, even though the Obama Photo has original expression, the transformative manner 
of use of the Obama Hope image is likely to convince the court to discount the second factor as 
having “limited usefulness.”251 Thus, this factor is, at most, neutral in assessing fair use in this 
case. 
 
3. Third Factor 
 
 It is true that Fairey used almost the entire image of Obama in the Obama Photo, but 
borrowing the entire work was inevitable in view of Fairey’s purpose. The Obama Hope image 
would have conveyed little of Obama’s messages of hope and change if his face was cut in half 
or the size reduced rather than enlarged. Similar to Defendant’s collage painting in Blanch, 
Fairey’s copying was reasonable given his transformative purpose “to convey the fact of the 
photograph to viewers of the painting,” and in light of the quality and value of the material he 
used.252 Accordingly, Fairey’s copying does not seem excessive or more than necessary, and this 
factor favors Fairey, or at least does not disfavor him. 
 
4. Fourth Factor 
 
 Because Garcia took the Obama Photo for the AP in 2006 and Fairey used it for the 
presidential election campaign in 2008, it is apparent that the Obama Hope image did not 
suppress the demand of the Obama Photo. In addition, considering that the AP used the Obama 
Photo for news reporting purpose in 2006, it seems unlikely that the AP would have developed a 
potential derivative market where it could have reasonably profited from the Obama Photo by 
using or licensing it for Obama’s campaign. In contrast, Fairey developed his own transformative 
market for the Obama Hope image, which apparently served a different market than the potential 
news market of the Obama Photo. Even if the AP had used the photograph for presidential 
election poster or sticker to support Obama, it is unclear how much substitution the Obama Hope 
image would have caused by usurping the AP’s share of election merchandise. 
 
As to the balance between the interests of the public and the copyright owner, 253 the 
public received a benefit of democracy as a result of Fairey’s use of the Obama Photo for 
political campaign, while the AP would have received little gain even though the use was denied.  
It follows that Fairey’s secondary use did not usurp the potential market of the AP’s copyrighted 
photograph. In fact, Fairey’s use ironically increased value of Garcia’s photograph and probably 




                                                 
250 See Leval, supra note 166, at 1119-20. 
251 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612. (2d Cir. 2006). 
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 Overall, considering the foregoing factors, the Second Circuit is likely to decide that 
Fairey’s copying of the AP’s Obama Photo was a fair use. Thus, even if the court decides that 
Fairey infringed the AP’s copyright in the Obama Photo, his use will be protected.  
 
IV. First Amendment and Political Use 
 
A. Relationship Between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment 
 
1. External Conflict 
 
 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”255 This Amendment is somewhat contradictory 
to the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to enact copyright 
legislation “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”256 On the one hand, the Constitution prohibits Congress 
from limiting people’s freedom of speech and expression, but on the other hand, the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to limit the right of people to use copyrighted expression without the 
copyright owner’s permission.257 Professor Melville B. Nimmer called this constitutional tension 
an “external conflict” as the conflict arises outside copyright laws.258 
 
2. Internal Conflict 
 
 According to Nimmer, in addition to external conflict, copyright laws themselves create 
“internal conflict.”259 Under the Copyright Clause, Congress may authorize the limited grant of 
monopoly privileges to copyright owners for an important public purpose.260 The purpose of the 
Copyright Clause is “to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision 
of a special reward, and allow the public access to the products of an author or inventor’s genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” 261  Through the limited statutory 
monopoly, copyright laws encourage an original author’s creative work, but the ultimate goal is 
“to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good” by “promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”262 
 
 However, the original author’s self-interest and the public interest sometimes conflict 
with each other. 263  This internal conflict happens simply because the public demands the 
copyrighted work at a low cost, while original authors demand the reward for creative labor.264 
More importantly, as in the Obama Hope case, there is also a temporal conflict between current 
authors who create an original expression and future authors who use such an expression in 
                                                 
255 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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derivative works.265 
 
3. Courts’ View—Reluctance to Invoke the First Amendment 
 
 Despite a governmental restriction on freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to invoke a First Amendment defense for secondary users in copyright cases. In Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, the first of only two cases in which the Supreme Court 
directly addressed these conflicts,266 the Court turned to the idea/expression dichotomy, and 
adopted the notion that the dichotomy strikes “a definitional balance between the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still 
protecting an author’s expression.”267 The Court based its rationale on an originalist theory: the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution “intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. 
By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”268 The Court then concluded that since the 
First Amendment protections were already embodied in the Copyright Act through the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, it did not have to recognize a separate First 
Amendment defense to create a broader direct exception to copyright.269 
 
 Nearly two decades later, the Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft again rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”), 
which extended the duration of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.270 Plaintiffs in 
that case contended that the CTEA regulated free speech, and would require First Amendment 
scrutiny.271 However, the Court found First Amendment scrutiny unnecessary. Since the Framers 
adopted the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment close in time, the Court interpreted that 
the Framers considered that “copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech 
principles.” 272  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “copyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations.” 273  First, the Copyright Act embraces the idea/expression 
dichotomy with copyright protection limited only to expression.274 Second, the fair use defense 
under section 107 of the Copyright Act “allows the public to use expression itself in certain 
circumstances.”275 Following the Supreme Court’s view, the Second Circuit has not invoked the 
First Amendment because the “fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in 
the copyright field.”276  
 
 To clarify this, Nimmer on Copyright used “labor division” and “ambassador” analogies. 
“Under this labor division argument, copyright laws and the First Amendment divide the areas of 
                                                 
265 Id. at § 19E.01[C] n.27. 
266 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech & Intellectual Property: Some Thought After Eldred 44 Liquormart, & 
Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 698 & n.2. (another case is Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)). 
267 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at539, 556. (1985). 
268 Id. at 558. 
269 Id. at 560. 
270 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at186, 222 (2003). 
271 Id. at 193-94. 
272 Id. at 186, 218-19. 
273 Id. at 219. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
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responsibility, to achieve the same goal.” 277  While “[c]opyright law is responsible for the 
production of creative works,”278 “[t]he First Amendment is responsible for the protection of that 
production” from governmental encroachment. 279  Under the ambassador analogy, the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine act as an ambassador “within the territory of 
copyright law and represent[] the interests of the foreign land of First Amendment.”280 
 
 Behind the courts’ reluctance to invoke the First Amendment, some judges may have the 
“constitutional avoidance” canon in mind. Generally “when the constitutionality of a statute is 
assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would 
be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is [courts’] plain duty to adopt that construction 
which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity.”281 Though courts have not explicitly 
mentioned it in copyright cases, one district court candidly applied this time-honored canon to 
the copyright statute.282 In theory, if the Copyright Act and the First Amendment operated at 
cross-purposes, the First Amendment would invalidate the Act.283 However, the court argued, 
“[r]ather than strike down an entire act as overbroad in such a situation, the judiciary prefers to 
interpret such a statute as narrowly as needed to preserve it for the effectuation of those of its 
purposes deemed consistent with the Constitution.”284 Moreover, courts would usually adhere to 
the principle of stare decisis, deferring to past precedents.285 
 
B. Criticisms of the Court’s View 
 
1. Dissenters’ First Amendment Concerns in the Supreme Court Cases 
 
In his dissenting opinion in Harper, Justice Brennan emphasized the importance of First 
Amendment values in copyright infringement cases.286 Especially concerned about a limitation 
of public debate, Justice Brennan stated that “every citizen must be permitted freely to marshal 
ideas and facts in the advocacy of particular political choices.”287 He argued that copyright laws 
served as the engine of free expression “only when the statutory monopoly does not choke off 
                                                 
277 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19E.05[B]. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19E.01[D]. 
281 United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909); see, e.g., United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 286 (2005) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave 
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt 
the latter.”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
(“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”). 
282 Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 626 F.2d 
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. (referring to Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346, 
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
285 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911-12 (2010). 
286 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
287 Id. at 582 n.4 (“It would be perverse to prohibit government from limiting the financial resources upon which a 
political speaker may draw . . . but to permit government to limit the intellectual resources upon which that speaker 
may draw.”). 
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multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of information and ideas.”288 Thus, 
“[t]o ensure the progress of arts and sciences and the integrity of First Amendment values, ideas 
and information must not be freighted with claims of proprietary right.”289 Accordingly, Justice 
Brennan disagreed with the majority, expressing his concern that the holding would curtail the 
free use of knowledge and ideas while “risk[ing] the robust debate of public issues that is the 
‘essence of self-government.’”290 
 
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Eldred, also pointed out the First Amendment issue.291 He 
agreed that when the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment work in tandem they reinforce 
a mutual goal, with “the first serving as an engine of free expression . . . the second assuring the 
government throws up no obstacle to its dissemination.”292 However, a particular statute, like the 
CTEA in that case, which “exceeds proper Copyright Clause bounds may set Clause and 
Amendment at cross-purposes, thereby depriving the public of the speech-related benefits that 
the Founders, through both, have promised.”293 Justice Breyer concluded that the Court should 
“review plausible claims that a copyright statute seriously, and unjustifiably, restricts the 
dissemination of speech somewhat more carefully than reference to this Court’s traditional 
Copyright Clause jurisprudence might suggest.”294 Although he dismissed the necessity of First 
Amendment strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny, he recommended a stricter review than the 
majority’s approach,295 implying a “rational basis with bite” test as adopted in Equal Protection 
and Due Process cases because it is more exacting scrutiny than the typical deferential rational 
basis test.296 
 
2. Eldred’s Implications 
 
 As seen above, the Supreme Court in Eldred found it “appropriate to construe copyright’s 
internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns.”297 The majority concluded that 
“copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address” First Amendment 
concerns.298 One commentator called attention to the word “generally,” which seems to imply 
there are some situations where courts might find the built-in safeguards—the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine—inadequate to protect First Amendment values. 299  In 
addition, although the court below decided that “copyrights are categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment,”300 the Supreme Court rejected its language as speaking 
                                                 
288 Id. at 589. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 604 (citation omitted). 




295 Id. at 244-45 (referring to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-450 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 223-224 (1982); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-538 (1973)). 
296 See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (“these cases found bite in the equal protection clause after 
explicitly voicing the traditionally toothless minimal scrutiny standard”). 
297 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 n.24. (majority opinion). 
298 Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
299 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19.05[C][2]. 
300 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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too broadly.301 Also the Court’s language indicates that First Amendment scrutiny might be 
necessary if Congress “altered the traditional contours of copyright protection.”302 Consequently, 
the case implied that the majority of the Court did not rule out addressing First Amendment 
based challenges to the copyright statute in the future.303 
 
3. First Amendment Concerns in the Obama Hope Case 
 
Copyright limitation on Fairey’s use of the Obama Photo would raise First Amendment 
issues for several reasons. First, Fairey’s expression concerns political speech through his Obama 
Hope image. As explained below, a political speech is categorized as one of the most important 
First Amendment goals, “self-governance.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its 
significance. For example, in a libel case where Defendant newspaper company referred to a 
criminal record of Plaintiff political candidate in its column,304 the Court stated that “it can 
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”305 Such notion is more apparent in 
campaign finance cases: “Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political 
expression . . . ."306 “[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether 
by design or inadvertence.”307 
 
In one case, Chief Justice Roberts even stated that “[t]he Government may not suppress 
lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become 
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter.” 308  There, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the campaign finance law which prohibited corporations from broadcasting 
campaign advertisement shortly before election.309 While the principal opinion (by two Justices) 
decided that the regulation was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff’s general policy-issue 
advertisement, 310  three concurring Justices noted that the statute facially violated the First 
Amendment.311 The Court eventually held that the regulation was facially unconstitutional in a 
later case involving an anti-Hillary Clinton documentary film.312 Considering that the Court 
prohibits governmental regulation over campaign financial resources under the First Amendment 
principle, it seems perverse for the Court to permit the copyright limitation on the intellectual 
resources (i.e. Obama Photo) that Fairey can use for the political campaign.313 
                                                 
301 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
302 Id. 
303 NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19.05[C][2]. 
304 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 266-67 (1971). 
305 Id. at 271-72. 
306 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of 
candidates . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
307 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
308 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 475 (2007). 
309 Id. at 455-57. 
310 Id. at 481-82. 
311 Id. at 501-04 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
312 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
313 See Harper & Row, Publ’er, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 n.4 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The second reason for the First Amendment concern is that the limitation on Fairey’s use 
would undermine the internal safeguards (idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine) of the 
Copyright Act, which are supposed to serve the First Amendment’s interest. As stated in Part II, 
since Obama had almost exclusive control over his expression when Garcia took his photograph, 
the Obama Photo has such thin originality that its idea and expression almost merge. 314 
Theoretically, the idea/expression dichotomy allows secondary authors to use the idea conveyed 
by the original author so that the government does not abridge the secondary authors’ freedom of 
speech. However, as in the Obama Hope case, where idea and expression are almost identical, 
the copyright limitation may fail to serve as the engine of free expression, working at cross-
purposes with the First Amendment. As one commentator pointed out, the notoriously 
unpredictable nature of the internal safeguards might induce considerable speaker self-
censorship.315 
 
Third, unlike typical artistic photographs, the subject of the Obama Photo was an elected 
public official. Since an opportunity to take good photographs of politicians is normally limited 
to media, it is difficult for the public to obtain desirable photographs. Similarly, it was likely near 
impossible for Fairey to find an ideal photograph that could fit his image of Obama unless 
borrowing one from another source.316 Thus, the AP’s claim seems analogous to a hypothetical 
situation where a reporter transcribes Obama’s public speech, and asserts the copyright 
protection in it. Under the First Amendment, the government cannot prevent people freely using 
such a transcribed speech to express an individual’s own opinion. 
 
C. First Amendment Approach 
 
1. Purposes of Free Speech 
 
 There are several theories for protecting freedom of speech, but the three classic First 
Amendment values are “self-governance,” “marketplace of ideas,” and “autonomy/self-
fulfillment.” 317  The “self-governance” theory stems from the idea that democracy can be 
furthered only through free public speech.318 The “marketplace of ideas” theory asserts that 
freedom of speech is essential to discover truth.319 In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United 
States, Justice Holmes wrote “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.”320 The more expansive “autonomy/self-fulfillment” theory 
                                                 
314 See Ets-Hokin v. SKYY Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
315 Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment; What Eldred Misses—and Portends, , Copyright And Free 
Speech: Comparative And International Analyses, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005, available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=614642. 
316 See Fairey Interview, supra note 45 (noting that Fairey looked for the photograph with “the direction of the gaze 
which [he] felt looked presidential, looked like Obama had some vision and some leadership, and that combined 
with the way that the light was falling”). 
317 Leachman v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 691 F. Supp. 961, 964 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 915 F.2d 1564 
(4th Cir. 1990); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 926 (3d ed., Aspen 
Publishers 2006); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3 (2009). 
318 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 926-27; SMOLLA, supra note 319, § 2:6. 
319 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 927-28; SMOLLA, supra note 319, § 2:4. 
320 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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emphasizes freedom of speech and expression as “an essential aspect of personhood and 
autonomy,”321 and stresses its value to “the dignity and self-realization of individual human 
beings.”322 
 
2. Basic First Amendment Analysis 
 
 When courts review First Amendment cases that involve freedom of speech, the judges 
“[invoke] the content-based/content-neutral distinction as the basis for [a court’s] decision.”323 
Although there are unprotected or less protected categories such as obscenity and defamation, 
“the First Amendment means that government [generally] has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”324 Thus, except a few limited 
areas, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”325 The Supreme Court in Turner 
Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission defined this two-tier standard of 
review: while courts “apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, 
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content,”326 they apply an intermediate 
level of scrutiny to “regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech.” 327  Therefore, 
content-based regulations on speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny but content-neutral 
regulations are usually subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
 
 For the regulation of speech to be content-neutral, the government must be neutral in both 
viewpoint and subject matter.328 “Viewpoint neutral means that the government cannot regulate 
speech based on the ideology of the message,”329 while “[s]ubject matter neutral means that the 
government cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the speech.”330 When the government 
regulation is content-based, strict scrutiny applies: “If a statute regulates speech based on its 
content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less 
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.”331 However, when the subject matter of a speech and expression is unprotected or 
less protected, the government’s regulation usually need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny, 
although strict scrutiny may still apply to content-based regulations.332 Such unprotected or less 
protected subjects include “incitement of illegal activity, fighting words and provocation of 
hostile audiences, obscenity and sexually oriented speech, defamatory speech . . . [and] 
commercial speech.”333 
 
                                                 
321 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 929. 
322 SMOLLA, supra note 319, § 2:5. 
323 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 932. 
324 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573-74 (2002). 
325 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
326 Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
327 Id. 
328 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 934. 
329 Id. (it would not be “viewpoint neutral” “for the government to say that pro-choice demonstrations are allowed in 
the park but antiabortion demonstrations are not allowed”). 
330 Id. at 934-35 (noting that it would not be “subject matter neutral” if a law allowed speech about labor or regulated 
only sexual speech). 
331 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citation omitted). 
332 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 986-87. 
333 Id. at 931. 
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A difficult task is to define intermediate scrutiny. The jurisprudence of the First 
Amendment is not so simple and the Supreme Court has applied various tests on an almost ad-
hoc basis.334 There are some cases where the Court defined intermediate scrutiny; one case that 
might be applicable to the Obama Hope case is Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, where the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance 
that prohibited the posting of signs on public property.335 Since the regulation extended to signs 
for political campaigns, supporters for a city council candidate filed a suit to enjoin enforcement 
of the ordinance.336 The Court recognized the risk of a sweeping statute to “repeatedly chill the 
exercise of expressive activity by many individuals.”337 Nonetheless, the Court rejected the facial 
challenge on overbreadth grounds, reasoning that such a constitutional challenge requires “a 
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment 
protections of parties not before the Court.”338 
 
 Instead, the Court examined the case on an “as applied” basis because the challenge was 
basically against the ordinance as applied to Plaintiffs’ activities.339 For reviewing the regulation, 
the viewpoint-neutrality nature of the ordinance called for the Court to apply intermediate 
scrutiny: 
 
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional 
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.340 
 
In addition, the Court there noted that “[w]hile the First Amendment does not guarantee the right 
to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, a restriction 
on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are 
inadequate.”341  Under this scrutiny, the Court rejected the as-applied challenge because the 
plaintiffs had other means to express in the same public place such as speaking and distributing 
literature.342  
 
3. Limited First Amendment Application in Copyright Cases 
 
As of today, there has been only one case where any court ruled that a part of the 
Copyright Act violated the First Amendment. 343  In Golan v. Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit 
                                                 
334 See SMOLLA, supra note 319, § 2:63. 
335 Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791-92 (1984). 
336 Id. at 792-93. 
337 Id. at 800. 
338 Id. at 789, 801 (1984). See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1839 (2008) (“[a]ccording to our First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. 
The doctrine seeks to strike a balance between competing social costs.”). 
339 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 802-03. 
340 Id. at 804-05. 
341 Id. at 812. 
342 Id. 
343 Stanford Law School, The Center for Internet and Society, Anthony Falzone, URAA Held Unconstitutional, Apr. 
3, 2009, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6149.  
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reviewed section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”),344 which required 
some literary and artistic works removed from the public domain.345 The court remanded the 
case to the district court for First Amendment scrutiny346  because the URAA “altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection” by extending a limited monopoly.347 
 
Subsequently retrying the case, the district court held that section 514 of the URAA 
violated the First Amendment.348 As both parties conceded that section 514 was content-neutral, 
the court applied intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny.349 Since the court’s review of 
Congress’ judgment is deferential, the court only asked whether the regulation was “substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”350 To answer this question, “the 
[c]ourt ask[ed] whether the regulation suppresses a substantial amount of protected [public] 
speech judged in relation to the Government’s legitimate interest.”351  If the statute “leaves 
unprotected a substantial amount of speech not tied to the Government’s interest . . . it is 
overbroad and unconstitutional.”352 The court placed the burden of proof on the government.353 
 
Similarly, Justice Breyer, dissenting in Eldred, suggested ad-hoc balancing, stating that a 
copyright statute might be unconstitutional: “(1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are 
private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the 
Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-
related objective.”354 Based on this three-part test, he would have decided that the CTEA violated 
the First Amendment.355 
 
D. Application to the Obama Hope Case 
 
1. External Constitutional Challenge - Prohibiting use of a media photo of a public 
figure violates the First Amendment as applied to the Obama Hope case  
 
As discussed in Section A, courts tend to avoid determining the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Act itself. Further, Fairey is not a case where Congress altered the traditional contours 
of copyright protection. However, the First Amendment’s fundamental goals should justify a free 
speech analysis in this case. Fairey created the Obama Hope image for a political purpose to 
support his choice of presidential candidate Obama.356 As discussed above regarding the First 
                                                 
344 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994), codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109 (1998 & 2008). 
345 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[s]ection 514 of the URAA implements Article 18 
of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works[, which] requires member countries to 
afford the same copyright protection to foreign authors as they provide their own authors”). 
346 Id. at 1196. 
347 Id. at 1192. 
348 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009). 
349 Id. at 1170-71. 
350 Id. at 1171. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002)). 
353 Id. at 1172. 
354 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 245 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
355 Id. at 266-67. 
356 See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1, Fairey v. Associated Press, 
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Amendment concerns, this case is distinct from previous major copyright cases in that the 
Obama Hope issue directly involves core First Amendment values—the original work is a public 
official’s photograph and the purpose of the secondary work was to support the official’s election 
campaign. It is reasonable to say that the Obama Hope image’s expression can be categorized as 
speech relating to self-governance, one of the most important goals the First Amendment is 
designed to protect.357 Hence, the court can validly review the constitutionality of the case by 
invoking the First Amendment. 
  
The next issue is whether Fairey’s First Amendment challenge against the Copyright Act 
will be on its face or on its application. Similar to the challenged statute in Vincent, the 
Copyright Act might have an overbreadth problem that “may inhibit the constitutionally 
protected speech of third parties.”358 However, considering copyright‘s long history promoting 
creation and dissemination of information, important goals of the First Amendment, it seems that 
there is little “realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized 
First Amendment protections of [third] parties.”359 In addition, “because of the wide-reaching 
effects of striking down a statute on its face,” the Court treats the overbreadth doctrine as “strong 
medicine” and employs it only as a last resort.360 Thus, Fairey’s possible constitutional challenge 
will not be facial, but as applied to the Obama Hope case.361  
 
As stated above, the Supreme Court implicated the First Amendment in cases where 
federal statutes regulated campaign financial resources on an as-applied basis.362 Accordingly, 
there seems no problem for the court to apply the same analysis to the Obama Hope case where 
the Copyright Act regulates Fairey’s campaign intellectual resources. Note that although the 
Obama Hope case is a dispute between private parties, as in New York Times v. Sullivan, a court 
can infer that the Copyright Act, as applied to this case, imposes invalid restrictions on Fairey’s 
freedom of speech.363 
 
The next inquiry arises regarding the appropriate standard of review for this case. On the 
one hand, different treatment of certain works, by asserting that some of them have higher value 
under the fair use doctrine, might deem copyright laws content-based.364 On the other hand, the 
Copyright Act seems content-neutral because the Act regulates all infringing speech and 
expression without referring to the work’s viewpoints or subject matter. The Act’s “target is not 
the viewpoint, subject matter, or even communicative impact of the infringer’s speech, but rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
No. 09 CIV 01123 attachment 1 (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 2009),  http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/41/1.html; see Arnon, supra note 27. 
357 See Leachman v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 691 F. Supp. 961, 964 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 915 F.2d 1564; 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 319, at 926; SMOLLA, supra note 319, § 2:3. 
358 Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984). 
359 Id. at 801. 
360 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1982). The Court there also invoked the constitutional avoidance 
canon, noting that “[w]hen a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, of 
course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction.” 
Id. at 769 n.24. 
361 See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 802-03 & n.22.  
362 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
14 (1976). 
363 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
364 Volokh, supra note 268, at 708.  
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the infringement’s deleterious impact on the copyright incentive.”365 For the sake of argument, 
this article will assume the Act’s content-neutrality and analyze the Obama Hope case by 
adopting intermediate scrutiny, which is more deferential to the government, and raising a bar for 
Fairey to overcome. Moreover, since Fairey asserted the First Amendment as one of his 
affirmative defenses,366 the burden may be imposed on him to prove the Act’s unconstitutionality 
as applied to his case. 
 
For intermediate scrutiny, the test in Vincent will be applicable. 367  As for the 
government’s interest, accomplishing the goals of the Copyright Clause seems 
important/substantial and even compelling. Moreover, the government’s interest is theoretically 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression despite the regulation on the secondary use of the 
copyrighted expression. But a difficult question is whether the scope of the incidental restriction 
on Fairey’s expression is substantially broader than necessary for the government to accomplish 
the ends.368 Although the restriction on Fairey’s expressive activity may be called “incidental” as 
a result of the government’s attempt to protect copyright, as in other copyright cases, here the 
copyright owner (the AP) is in a position to determine whether to regulate Fairey’s expressive 
activity. Accordingly, as the Court in Vincent implied, a crucial question will be whether Fairey 
had the adequate remaining modes of communication.369 
 
The copyright restriction on Fairey’s expressive activity could deprive him of his only 
adequate communication method. If the Copyright Act prevents Fairey from using the AP’s 
Obama Photo to express his support for Obama through his Obama Hope image, it is likely that 
Fairey would have been forced to look for another Obama photograph, possibly leading to a 
different legal dispute. After all, Senator Obama is a public official who served all the people. 
Meanwhile, individuals had little chance to take good photographs of him, unlike the media and 
its professional photographers. Especially in this case, originality of the Obama Photo is thin and 
its expression is almost identical with its idea.370 Prohibiting the public from using such a factual 
photograph of a public official to express political thought seems to be substantially broader than 
necessary to protect media’s old copyrighted photograph. Such regulations will likely chill 
public debate and stifle freedom of speech, which undermines not only Fairey’s interest to speak 
freely, but also the public’s ability to receive information. Certainly Fairey had other ways to 
express his political viewpoint, but other methods would not have been as adequate or effective 
as his art. Therefore, the copyright restriction as applied to this case violates the First 
Amendment. 
 
2. Internal Constitutional Challenge—Fairey’s political use of the Obama Photo would 
reinforce his claim under the Copyright Act’s internal safeguards 
 
 To the extent that courts tend to avoid “external” First Amendment invocation, Fairey 
                                                 
365 Netanel, supra note 17, at 49. 
366 Motion to Amend/Correct 21 Answer to Counterclaim, 1 Complaint, 35 Answer to Counterclaim at 21 Exhibit B 
part 2, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 CIV 01123 (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 2009),  
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/340121/41/5.html. 
367 Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984). 
368 See id. 
369 Id. at 812. 
370 See Ets-Hokin v. SKYY Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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could assert a First Amendment defense accommodated by the Copyright Act’s internal 
safeguards (idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine).371 As Nimmer on Copyright 
suggests, since the Act embodies idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine in order to 
serve as an “ambassador” representing the Amendment’s interest, the court should recognize the 
Act’s spirit.372 Moreover, the Third Circuit stated that: 
 
The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the 
extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the 
public’s right to be informed regarding matters of general interest when anyone 
seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of quite 
a different nature.373 
 
Professor Neil W. Netanel suggested that employing First Amendment principles is necessary for 
copyright’s internal safeguards to actually protect First Amendment values.374 Thus, emphasizing 
First Amendment values will likely reinforce Fairey’s claim under the internal safeguards of the 
Copyright Act discussed in Part II and III above. 
 
First, as in the Obama Hope case, when it is difficult to distinguish an idea from its 
expression, and when originality is “thin,” courts should inject more spirit of the First 
Amendment when reviewing copyright infringement issues.375 As noted above, courts consider 
substantial similarity by comparing an original work and its secondary work qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively.376 In light of the First Amendment’s goal, Fairey should stress his use of the 
Obama Photo as political speech for a self-governance purpose. If the court invalidates his 
expressive activity as copyright infringement in order to protect an old photograph of a public 
official, such a regulation will seriously undermine both the First Amendment goal and the 
Copyright Act’s purpose. Consequently, despite the quantitative similarity between Fairey’s 
image and the photograph, there is no substantial qualitative similarity between an old media 
photograph of a politician and an iconic collage of a presidential candidate. Particularly in this 
case, since the original idea of Obama and his expression are almost identical, copyright 
limitation on Fairey’s expressive activity based on the idea/expression dichotomy seems to fail to 
serve the First Amendment interest. 
 
 Second, a fair use defense, especially transformative use, may be the place where the 
spirit of the First Amendment can work more effectively. 377  Based on the inquiry for 
transformative use, Fairey can emphasize that his political use had completely different purpose 
                                                 
371 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 n.24 (2003) (comparing to United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 
513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)). 
372 See NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19E.05 [C][2]. 
373 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 (3d Cir. 2003). 
374 Netanel, supra note 317, at 31. 
375 See NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19E.05[C][2] (“the explicit instruction to construe the copyright mechanisms to 
carry the weight of the First Amendment may inject a fresh spirit into the [idea/expression and fair use] doctrines, 
especially in borderline cases”). 
376 See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). 
377 See NIMMER, supra note 66, § 19E.05[C][2] (“the fair use defense is recognized as not merely a nicety of 
copyright law. It is tasked by the Constitution to be the First Amendment’s ambassador in the territory of copyright, 
to champion free speech concerns; hence, it cannot be abolished or even narrowed.”). 
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from the AP’s commercial or journalistic use, which is strongly factual. In addition to the Obama 
Hope image’s new purpose and character discussed in Part III, the court should also take First 
Amendment values into consideration. For example, in analyzing the first factor of fair use, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that parody has “socially significant value as free speech under the First 
Amendment.”378 Since political speech arguably has more significant value than parody, the 
court should recognize the self-governance value of the First Amendment in Fairey’s use. 
Emphasis on political use will also make a difference in the fourth factor, effect on the market. It 
is very unlikely that such political speech for the presidential campaign usurps any actual or 
potential derivative markets of the AP’s unused news photograph because the two works serve 
completely different markets. The political use of the Obama Hope image was transformatively 




 Overall, despite his admission that he deleted evidence, Fairey has a significant chance to 
win his case. First, Fairey’s Obama Hope is protected by the idea/expression dichotomy because 
his work is not substantially similar to the Obama Photo’s protected elements. Since the Obama 
Photo has thin originality and its idea and expression could almost merge, Fairey’s modification 
of the original work is likely sufficient. Second, even assuming that the court finds substantial 
similarity between both works, Fairey created the Obama Hope image for such a different 
purpose that the fair use doctrine protects his work. Third, in light of the First Amendment’s 
purpose, Fairey’s political use of the original AP photograph depicting a public official should 
exonerate Fairey’s appropriation. The Copyright Act as applied to this case violates the First 
Amendment, while the Amendment’s value would strengthen Fairey’s claim for non-substantial 




                                                 
378 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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